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Summary
This paper engages with the broader debate about the failures of representa-
tive democracy through a critical analysis of political cleavages in Croatia 
from 1991 until the present. Building on existing studies which repeatedly 
show that in Croatia political party competition is not structured along socio-
economic cleavages, I argue that a socioeconomic cleavage exists in society, 
but is not represented in the parliamentary arena. This hypothesis is backed up 
by data from the ISSP survey (2009), aggregate comparative data as well as 
an overview of existing studies. Available evidence points to growing social 
stratification in society, while the citizens of Croatia are aware of socioeco-
nomic inequalities, they exhibit egalitarian value orientations and their eco-
nomic preferences seem coherent when approached from a social class per-
spective. The second part of the paper formulates potential explanations for 
this proposed mismatch between social dynamics and its representation in the 
parliamentary arena, ranging from the role of communist historical legacies 
and the impact of nation-building and war in the 1990s, towards considering 
the way in which major political parties were influenced by European politi-
cal party families and the European integration process more broadly. Overall, 
the analysis suggests that in Croatia structural conditions are conducive to a 
socioeconomic cleavage, but that interests on their own cannot trigger collec-
tive social action – effective representation must be fought for through politi-
cal articulation and mobilisation.
Keywords: political cleavages, political party competition, representative de-
mocracy, socioeconomic inequalities, Croatia in comparative context
Since the spread of the economic crisis, discussions about failures of representative 
democracy have gained momentum both as an intellectual debate and as a broader 
social phenomenon in many European countries, including Croatia. Though it has 
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long been acknowledged that existing democratic political systems fail to fulfil the 
core principle of ‘ruling in common for the common’ (Brown, 2012), the contempo-
rary critique of democracy argues that even a limited form of representative demo-
cracy fails to deliver on its key preconditions. According to this critique, even 
though corporate power has always jeopardised the promise of popular political 
rule, in recent decades the process of state collusion with capital has reached an 
unprecedented pitch, creating a sort of ‘oligopoly of elite insiders’ that disregard 
citizens’ preferences (ibid.). In reaction to the financial crisis, governments have 
sought to restore their economies by rescuing banks, and then tagged the bill onto 
the average citizen who is paying for this rescue, as well as suffering cuts in re-
duced public services and higher taxation (Streeck, 2011). Contemporary social 
movements across Europe that took the form of the Indignados in Spain, people’s 
protests at Sintagma square in Greece, student protests in Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, 
Croatia and elsewhere, as well as various incarnations of the Occupy movement in 
the US and Europe were all to some extent motivated by a sense of betrayal of the 
representative process on the one hand, and by a rejection of economic policies that 
aggravate poverty, unemployment and other forms of social injustice on the other.
This paper engages with this broader debate by offering a critical re-appraisal 
of the premises of representative democracy through an empirical analysis of politi-
cal cleavages in Croatia in the period from 1991 until the present. The fundamental 
premise of representative democracy is that political parties represent the interests 
of different social groups. In other words, at each election, citizens are presented 
with a set of meaningful alternatives among which they choose the party that best 
represents their interests, and in this way they indirectly participate in government. 
These premises of representative democracy are built into Lipset and Rokkan’s 
(1967) theory of political cleavages. This theoretical approach guides the major-
ity of empirical work in political science that aims to explain the linkages between 
voters and their political representatives. According to this theory, political parties 
serve to aggregate the interests of citizens into packages of programmes and com-
mitments. The precise constellation of alignments between voters and parties dif-
fers from country to country since this depends on specific historical circumstances, 
but overall parties play a key integrative role by institutionalising social conflicts 
within political systems. They represent regular channels for expressing conflicting 
interests, and while this may sometimes bring about periods of instability (as was 
the case with the extension of suffrage in the early 20th century), overall the aggre-
gation of conflicting social interests through political parties is considered as con-
tributing to the stability of nation-states. 
Drawing on Parsons’ paradigm of societal interactions, Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) proposed that social conflicts form around two types of stable political clea-
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vages: the territorial-cultural and the functional. The first refers to conflicts over 
conceptions of nationhood and national priorities, conflicts between the centre and 
peripheral regions, as well as conflicts over ethnic and minority issues. Functional 
conflicts on the other hand are centred on the allocation of resources and benefits, 
and they can be thought of as conflicts between workers and capital. In other words, 
Lipset and Rokkan’s concept of the socioeconomic cleavage is broadly equivalent 
to the Marxist conception of class as a social relation of production whereby in capi-
talist societies the fundamental cleavage is between owners of means of production 
and owners of labour power (Wright, 2005). Actual political systems represent dif-
ferent configurations of these cleavages, and may be thought of as falling within a 
grid formed in the intersection of these two axes. The territorial-cultural cleavage 
can take the form of conflict along the values of universalism versus nationalism, 
authoritarianism versus democracy, secularism versus religiosity, or further Europe-
an integration versus isolationism. On the other hand, the socioeconomic cleavage 
can take the form of free market doctrine versus state intervention, the more mode-
rate cleavage regarding distributional preferences among for instance public invest-
ment in national security versus into education, or it may in some historical periods 
take the shape of a more fundamental cleavage among pro- and anti-capitalist in-
terests. If engaged from the perspective of contemporary political theory, these two 
main political cleavages can also be thought of as structuring conflict along identity 
versus interest-based politics, or to apply Nancy Fraser’s dichotomy, among recog-
nition versus redistribution claims (2000, 2003).
Engaging with this theory of political cleavages, the key argument I propose 
is that in Croatia the arena of political party competition does not reflect grow-
ing socioeconomic divisions in society, and that this can be interpreted as a failure 
of political representation. This argument is based on an empirical analysis of the 
ISSP survey (2009) and aggregate-level data, as well as on an overview of exist-
ing studies of political cleavages in Croatia in the period 1991-2010. The analysis 
suggests that in Croatia political party competition is not structured along the so-
cioeconomic cleavage, which opens up two possible explanations. If we start from 
the premise that representative democracy works, then it follows that there is no 
socioeconomic cleavage in Croatian society. Since analysis in this paper makes this 
explanation quite unlikely, I advance an alternative hypothesis according to which 
the socioeconomic cleavage exists in society, but it is not represented in the arena 
of parliamentary democracy. The objective of the paper therefore is to search for 
explanations for this mismatch between social dynamics and its representation in 
the parliamentary arena. 
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Exploring Socioeconomic Inequalities in Croatia
In the early 1990s Croatia underwent an economic transformation from socialist 
self-management to a market economy, which ‘resulted in the largest redistribution 
of economic resources in its history’ (Henjak, Zakošek and Čular, forthcoming). In 
this economic transformation, arguably the key polarizing divide among citizens of 
post-communist countries emerged between the winners and the losers (Zakošek, 
1998), as well as through the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion from the work 
process (Hodžić, 2005). Compared to 1991, in the early 2000s the employment rate 
was reduced by a third, the unemployed rate grew to around 20% while the number 
of retired people doubled (ibid.). A decade after the regime change Croatia exhibited 
the characteristics of precarious work conditions, structural unemployment, early re-
tirement and risk of poverty, or in other words many ingredients that could ferment 
social conflict between the winners and losers of the economic transformation.
After the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe both real wages and 
employment decreased. On average, real wages dropped by one-fourth between 
1987-88 and 1994, while unemployment grew from zero percent to between 12 
and 15 percent of the labour force (Milanović, 1998). While during the 1970s and 
the first part of the 1980s there was a downward trend in inequality in Croatia, the 
GINI coefficient increased from 0.27 in 1988 to 0.32 in 2010 (CBS, 2011; Nestić, 
2003, 2005). When compared to the EU regarding income inequality, measured ei-
ther by the GINI index or the quintile share ratio1, Croatia exhibits higher inequality 
than the EU27 average (CBS, 2011). Similarly, the most recent data on poverty re-
veal Croatia to be among the top 5 European countries with highest proportions of 
population at risk of poverty (ibid.). Eurostat’s indicator for poverty risk2 was only 
recently introduced into official government statistics, helping to situate Croatia 
within a European context. In 2010 the risk of poverty rate in Croatia was 31.3 per-
cent, compared to the EU27 average of 23.4 percent. When it comes to the risk of 
poverty for people older than 65 years of age, Croatia is among the three worst per-
formers of all European states. While the EU average risk of poverty rate for people 
older than 65 is 16 percent, in Croatia it is almost double, at 27.7 percent (Eurostat, 
2010). Similarly, when a related indicator of material deprivation3 is used Croatia is 
at 32.4 percent, compared to the 17.5 percent EU27 average (ibid.).
1 Quintile share ratio represents the ratio between the total equivalised income of the 20% of 
population with the highest income and the 20% of population with the lowest income.
2 An individual is considered at risk of poverty if the equivalised income of her household is be-
low the 60 percent threshold of the national household equivalised median income, which means 
that poverty is defined in relative terms (Eurostat, 2010).
3 EU data agencies have recently introduced an indicator measuring material deprivation, which 
tries to capture the extent to which people are able to meet basic needs. The difference among the 
Dolenec, D., The Absent Socioeconomic Cleavage in Croatia...
73
Unemployed people are 80-100 percent more likely to be at risk of poverty, 
while the self-employed, the retired and other economically inactive people are 
also exposed to higher risk of poverty (Šućur, 2011). In recent years, retired peo-
ple were 33 percent more likely to be at risk of poverty than the national average 
(ibid.). The official registered unemployment rate in Croatia in October 2012 was 
19.6 percent (CBS website, 2012), compared to 10.2 percent average unemploy-
ment in the EU27.4 In this group, 42 percent are the long-term unemployed, a group 
that is particularly exposed to risks of social exclusion and poverty. Finally, Croatia 
has 1,215,539 retired people. While persons belonging to the Croatian Army or War 
Veterans groups have on average somewhat higher monthly pensions, the large ma-
jority of pensioners (over 1.1 million) in Croatia receive a monthly pension of 2.147 
Kuna – i.e. an amount below the minimum wage5. When all these groups are added 
up, it seems that around 35 percent or more of the Croatian population makes a liv-
ing of less than 2.815 Kuna6 per month (Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić, 2012).
Therefore, we have substantial evidence of growing social stratification in 
Croatia, as well as worrying signals of social exclusion through poverty and long-
term unemployment. The question that this opens is whether these macro-trends are 
reflected in the attitudes of Croatia’s citizens. The following sections analyse sur-
vey data from the International Social Survey Project (ISSP)7. The survey module 
on social inequalities was implemented in 2009 in 38 countries including Croatia, 
on representative samples of on average 1,000 respondents per country. Figure 1 on 
the next page shows respondents’ agreement with the existence of conflict between 
workers and management, which is taken to signal awareness of a socioeconomic 
conflict in society. Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents who either agree 
two indicators may be thought of as between an indirect and a direct, outcome-driven approach 
to real conditions of livelihoods which are not fully reliant on monetary exchange. Currently 
used indicators of material deprivation are based on measuring whether individuals are able to 
face unexpected expenses, have one week of annual holiday away from home, pay mortgage and 
rent (utility bills etc.), have a meal with meat, chicken or fish every second day, keep the home 
warm, have a washing machine, colour tv, telephone and personal car. It is defined as the pro-
portion of people living in households who lack at least 3 of these 9 items because they cannot 
afford them (Eurostat, 2010).
4 Eurostat official data for February 2012.
5 Based on the Minimum Wage Act (Official Gazette No. 67/2008), the minimum wage be-
tween June 2011 and May 2012 in Croatia is 2.814 Kuna.
6 According to the still unofficial 2011 Census, the population of Croatia is 4,290,612.
7 The ISSP is the oldest international research project in the field of social sciences, taking place 
in 48 participating countries. Croatia has been participating in the project since 2005, through 
the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb. More information about the research programme is 
available online at http://www.issp.org/.
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or strongly agree with this statement, for respondents from Croatia and eleven other 
European countries. The group of countries selected for comparison is composed of 
several old European democracies (Germany, Austria, France, the UK), Portugal as 
a peripheral European state and a group of post-communist democracies (Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). 
As can be seen from Figure 1, 50.47 percent of citizens of Croatia perceive a 
conflict between workers and management. While in a comparative perspective this 
conflict is not as accentuated in Croatia as in Hungary or Portugal, half of the popu-
lation nevertheless represents a considerable proportion. This perception may be 
due, on the one hand, to the social history of self-management, and, at least in part, 
to the fact that the process of privatization has been highly contested in Croatia, 
including instances of factory occupations by workers (Grdešić, 2007), demonstra-
tions, strikes and other forms of contentious politics. In addition to that, union mem-
bership in Croatia is relatively high. Though the union movement has been substan-
tially fragmented since regime change, union membership in Croatia is around 35 
percent; higher than the EU average of 25 percent and higher than in many other 
post-communist countries (Bagić, 2010). 
Furthermore, survey data reveals that citizens of Croatia consider questions of 
social justice important. According to 46.95 percent of citizens family background 
is crucial for getting ahead in Croatian society (ISSP, 2009). In other words, one 
in two respondents perceives Croatia as a socially stratified society where family 
Figure 1: Perception of conflict between workers and management
Source: ISSP, 2009
Dolenec, D., The Absent Socioeconomic Cleavage in Croatia...
75
background to a large extent determines one’s future prospects. Also, when asked 
whether they agree that only the rich can afford the costs of university education, 
50.3 percent of Croatia’s respondents agree or strongly agree with that statement. 
Furthermore, large proportions of respondents not only perceive these problems 
but understand them as social justice issues. In the survey they were asked to de-
cide whether they thought it was just or unjust that people with higher incomes can 
buy better education for their children. Among respondents from the twelve coun-
tries, citizens of Croatia are most convinced that the availability of better educa-
tion should not depend on family income. Over 65 percent of respondents consider 
such a situation as very unjust. Also, a large proportion of respondents consider it 
the state’s responsibility to address social justice concerns. In the ISSP survey, 45.8 
percent of Croatia’s respondents strongly agreed that the government should be act-
ing to reduce income inequalities. This high proportion represents a formidable po-
tential constituency for political action motivated by social justice concerns. Even 
when the question is posed in the negative direction, stating that the government 
should spend less on benefits for the poor, respondents from Croatia do not sway in 
their attitude towards redistribution. A large majority of 74.52 percent disagree or 
strongly disagree with that statement, which makes Croatia’s citizens the most sup-
portive of redistribution in the given group of countries apart from the Germans. 
The findings from the ISSP survey echo findings from the 1970s in Yugoslavia, 
which showed persistent egalitarian value orientations in the Croatian population. 
Županov developed the argument for the existence of an egalitarian syndrome, i.e. 
a cluster of values that include redistributive ethics, norms regarding egalitarian dis-
tribution as well as state paternalism and other elements (1969). Though Županov’s 
evidence of a syndrome (i.e. mutually interrelated values) is problematic,8 empiri-
cal studies in Croatia confirm strong preferences for egalitarianism and state pro-
tectionism in the population (e.g. Štulhofer, 1997, 2000; Domazet, Dolenec and 
Ančić, 2012). Taking all this on board, it seems plausible to expect that the growing 
socioeconomic stratification since the 1990s would result in the emergence of the 
socioeconomic cleavage in the arena of parliamentary party competition. However, 
as empirical studies repeatedly show, this is not the case.
Taking the self-identification of voters on the left-right continuum of party 
competition as their starting point, a number of empirical studies from the early 
1990s showed that ethnicity and religious identification formed the dominant clea-
vage that structured the political party system in Croatia (Šiber, 1991, 1993; Šiber 
and Welzel, 1997). Conversely, an individual’s socioeconomic position did not 
structure her political affiliation, signalling an almost non-existent socioeconomic 
8 In addition to that, Županov’s interpretations of how egalitarianism impacts development are 
also open to criticism.
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cleavage in Croatia (Grdešić et al., 1991; Šiber, 1993). Translated into individual 
voter characteristics, a person’s ethnic and confessional affiliation had the strongest 
impact on party affiliation and voter behaviour, while age, occupation and other so-
cio-demographic characteristics were much less important (Šiber and Welzel, 1997; 
Šiber, 2001). In his study from the mid-1990s Zakošek also found the primacy of 
the territorial-cultural cleavage (Zakošek, 1998). Religious identity created a cultur-
al cleavage which progressively overlapped with the territorial cleavage since the 
Catholic Church became one of the main proponents of Croatian national autono-
my, strongly linking Catholic religious identity with anti-communism and national-
ism (ibid.). As a result, studies during the 1990s showed that in Croatia voters did 
not meaningfully connect the terms left and right with the socioeconomic dimen-
sion of political conflict but with the ideological-cultural dimension (ibid.).
Along the same lines, Šiber showed that family attitude towards the Second 
World War had a significant influence on political self-identification in Croatia in 
the mid-1990s (1998). When it came to cultural values, during the 1990s respond-
ents identifying with right-wing parties exhibited clericalism, nationalism and patri-
archy (Zakošek, 1998). In addition to that, citizens who fall within the traditionalist 
camp were also the same ones who exhibited strong nationalist preferences. The 
fact that these two dominant traits were congruent in the voting body of Croatia 
contributed to their longevity as the dominant structuring cleavage in Croatia’s po-
litical space during the 1990s. In addition to that, the existing cultural cleavage was 
continuously reinvigorated through family socialisation.
Has this changed in the second decade since the regime change in Croatia? In 
attempting to define the dominant factors that influence left-right self-identification 
in Croatia, Henjak analysed survey data on voters collected before the 2003 parlia-
mentary election (2005). His findings confirm the identification of right-wing voters 
with traditionalism and religiosity, as well as a reduced tolerance towards ethnic mi-
norities. Moreover, he identifies the strongest effect on left-right self-identification 
in the attitude towards the Second World War which, when introduced, increases the 
explanatory reach of his model by a third, as well as having the strongest independ-
ent effect. This study confirmed Šiber’s findings about the relevance of family his-
tory with respect to the Second World War as the defining characteristic of left-right 
orientation in Croatia. Another analysis undertaken on a different survey sample 
before the 2003 election returned similar results (Bagić, 2007). Among the various 
attitudes, the issue that most firmly structured the political space in Croatia in 2003 
was the question of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. The second most relevant 
factor structuring party identification in Croatia was the attitude towards abortion 
and traditional values more broadly (ibid.). 
In the second half of the 2000s, the main contours of political cleavages re-
mained the same. Ferić (2008) analysed opinion poll data collected before the 2007 
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election to find that socio-demographic characteristics were unable to explain vo-
ters’ political choices. A person’s income explained less than 5% in the variance of 
the choice of party, reinstating earlier research which shows that a person’s socio-
economic status is a poor predictor of party-voter linkages. Henjak (2007) also 
finds that the division between transitional winners and losers does not determine 
support for any political party. More interestingly, he argues that voters’ attitudes to-
wards the economy in Croatia are mostly structured by their party affiliation, which 
can be interpreted to mean that political parties play an instrumental part in formu-
lating public opinion and in effect structure new cleavages in society. This is again 
in line with earlier research according to which voter party linkages are reproduced 
in society through family history with respect to the Second World War (Henjak, 
2011). Finally, even the most recent studies that cover the 2011 parliamentary elec-
tion find that the economic axis of competition is not relevant for voters’ choice of 
political party affiliation (Nikić Čakar and Čular, 2012).
How do we interpret these consistent empirical findings? According to Lipset 
and Rokkan’s (1967) classical thesis, a political cleavage remains salient when for 
whatever reason the specific issue has not been satisfactorily resolved. Stated nega-
tively, the assumption of this theory is that if a political cleavage is not salient, the 
underlying social conflict has been resolved or has not emerged. Repeated studies 
show that in Croatia the socioeconomic cleavage is not salient for voter-party link-
ages, but does that warrant the conclusion according to which there is no socioeco-
nomic cleavage in society? Earlier studies also seem to have been puzzled by this 
phenomenon. Already in the late 1990s Zakošek (1998, 2001) predicted that the 
socioeconomic cleavage would gain importance with the strengthening of redis-
tributive struggles and the growing disappointment with the privatisation processes. 
Again in 2003 Zakošek and Čular predicted that the socioeconomic class cleavage 
would become mobilized in the future, and recently Henjak (2011) repeated the 
same prediction. 
Though the ISSP survey is not comparable to the pre-election surveys that were 
quoted earlier, a number of question items in this survey also gauge citizens’ eco-
nomic preferences. The survey asks respondents whether they think differences in 
income are too large, whether equal opportunities exist for higher education, whether 
the state should play a redistributive role in society, as well as other questions present-
ed in the comparative section. When answers to these questions are analysed by ex-
ploring measures of association or analyses of variance, overall the findings confirm 
that left-right party affiliation does not translate into meaningful left-right attitudes 
on socioeconomic issues (Table 1 on the next page shows coefficients). However, the 
ISSP survey also asks respondents to place themselves in a given social class. This 
item is used to establish whether self-positioning with respect to social class yields 
different results regarding coherence of left-right economic preferences. 
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Table 1: Measures of association and analysis of variance





X2 (Chi sq) Anova X2 (Chi sq) Anova
differences in income too large – ** * *
equal opportunities for HE – – *** ***
taxation should be progressive – – *** ***
redistributive role
of the state
– – – ***
decent standard for the
unemployed
– – ** ***
spending for the poor – * – –
unjust better schooling – – * **
family background important – – – *
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05
As can be seen from Table 1, while party affiliation does not translate into 
meaningful left-right economic preferences, self-positioning with respect to so-
cial class does. Regardless of whether we analyse association or existence of vari-
ance among groups, the findings show significant differences among social classes. 
These findings are interesting for two reasons. First of all, they confirm earlier 
research according to which in Croatia party affiliation is not related with left or 
right economic preferences. However, this analysis suggests that this finding is not 
enough to infer a lack of coherence in attitudes towards socioeconomic questions 
among Croatia’s citizens. Looking at all the evidence presented here, it seems fair to 
say not only that they recognize socioeconomic inequalities, but that their attitudes 
towards these issues exhibit meaningful patterns when approached from a social 
class perspective. These findings suggest that both objective social conditions and 
divergent socioeconomic interests among Croatia’ citizens merit the representation 
of the socioeconomic cleavage in the arena of parliamentary party competition, 
though currently this is not the case. 
In Search of Explanations 
The previous sections offered evidence of increasing socioeconomic inequality, 
high levels of egalitarianism and redistributive preferences in Croatia compared 
to other European countries, as well as suggested that self-identification according 
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to social class yields meaningful distinctions with respect to left-right economic 
preferences. These findings suggest that the arena of representative democracy in 
Croatia indeed does not reflect existing structural cleavages in society, but leaves 
us with the task of devising hypotheses that could help explain this. The following 
sections identify explanations for this mismatch from the existing literature, which 
I extend in a critical dialogue with the theory of political cleavages.
Existing research on political cleavages offers some explanations for the weak-
ness of the socioeconomic cleavage in Croatia. The first one espouses the impor-
tance of nation-state formation and the conflict over state borders in the early 1990s 
in creating a persistence of the territorial cleavage as dominant in Croatia (Zakošek, 
1998, 2002). The violent events of the early 1990s tabooed issues of economic in-
equality, removing them from public discourse and the political agenda. Within the 
nationalist ideology of the 1990s, socioeconomic conflicts were perceived as under-
mining the homogenous national community and, given the real threat of national 
sovereignty in the early 1990s, they were perceived as national treason (Županov, 
1995). A homogenous ethnic community could stand no internal divisions, so ac-
tivities that would in another context be considered as strengthening pluralism were 
in Croatia in the 1990s treated as disloyal behaviour corrosive for the newly estab-
lished republic (Dolenec, forthcoming). Once the public sphere began to pluralise in 
the late 1990s and the 2000s, it did so on the grounds of ethnicised politics and the 
cultural axis of political competition.
Secondly, the cultural cleavage remained persistent in Croatia because it re-
presented a historical conflict over the status of the Catholic Church, which was 
deepened during state socialism due to its explicit anti-Catholic politics and its radi-
cal secularization. Here Kitschelt’s (1992, 1995) argument regarding the hierarchy 
of cleavages becomes important. According to him, conflicts which pertain to the 
definition of the political community supersede other types of conflict. In the next 
step, once the political community becomes established, conflicts over the reach of 
political decision-making, which include rights of citizenship, civil rights and fun-
damental worldviews, supersede those over the redistribution of societal resources 
(ibid.). Though Kitschelt himself sometimes disregards this hierarchy (Zakošek, 
1998), in Croatia the long domination of the territorial cleavage, coupled with the 
fact that territorial and cultural cleavages closely overlap, contributed to the persist-
ent under-politicization of the socioeconomic cleavage. In addition to that, clea-
vages exhibit high path-dependency – ‘freezing’ once they have taken on a defini-
tive shape and changing only when powerful historical forces affect the structure of 
political alignments (Henjak, Zakošek and Čular, forthcoming). 
Next, Kitschelt et al. (1999) drew on the legacy of communist regimes for ex-
planations of the resulting constellations of party competition. They formulated a 
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complex typology with many elements, but one of its principle dimensions is the 
nature of relations between the Communist Party and its opposition. Croatia and 
Slovenia had strong national movements that strived for more independence and de-
centralisation of the Yugoslav state. As a result, in Croatia the Communist Party was 
trying to accommodate appeals to national autonomy and square the circle between 
national demands on the one hand and the official communist ideology on the other 
(ibid.). In such cases, after regime change economic questions are as salient as any-
where, but political parties find it hard to introduce them into political competition 
because the communist successor parties embrace market liberalism (1999: 72). As 
a result, a tripolar system of party divides develops between a secular libertarian 
market-oriented camp, a secular libertarian post-communist camp and a Christian 
conservative camp with mixed economic positions (Kitschelt et al., 1999). These 
three camps were indeed recognizable in Croatia in the mid-1990s, with Social 
Democrats and the Croatian Democratic Union as the two large parties and a weak 
liberal centre where parties frequently fractioned. According to Kitschelt’s predic-
tions, in such cases political party arenas would be dominated by the cultural and 
territorial cleavages, which is in line with the empirical findings for Croatia. 
Kitschelt’s explanation is crucial because it draws attention to the fact that po-
litical parties are not ‘transmission belts’, which represent societal interests through 
some kind of automatic process. While Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of political 
cleavages was based on the experience of West European states where the repre-
sentation of class conflict in the parliamentary arena was the combined effect of the 
extension of suffrage, workers’ movements and the emergence of socialist parties, 
in post-communist countries the development of political representation resembled 
an incongruous process of building an aquarium from fish soup9: diverse social in-
terests were supposed to become politically represented by fractions from within 
the communist elites. Therefore, it may be said that initially the structure of party 
competition represented cleavages among elites rather than divergent societal inter-
ests. Adding to that, in order to win elections political parties act strategically. Po-
litical cleavages can be understood as a space of party competition along two axes, 
as shown in Figure 2 (on the next page).
The assumption is that in any given national political system parties take po-
sitions within quadrants of this grid depending on underlying social conflicts, but 
also based on strategic considerations. Historically European social democratic par-
ties were in the upper left quadrant (marked as ‘SD’), espousing liberal cultural 
values such as secularism and gender equality and at the same time advocating a 
role for the state in curbing market forces. Similarly, European Christian Democra-
9 This is a paraphrase of a sentence attributed to Lech Walesa.
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tic parties espoused traditional cultural values together with pro-market economic 
policies. Their position in the grid is in the lower right quadrant (marked as ‘CD’). 
However, since the 1990s Social Democratic parties increasingly embraced eco-
nomic liberalism under the slogan of the Third Way (Callinicos, 2001; Judt, 2010). 
As a result, in many contemporary European democracies the upper left quadrant 
has been emptied of major parliamentary parties, and the dominant political clea-
vage has been the territorial-cultural one. 
Initially the situation in post-communist countries was different. At the begin-
ning of the 1990s, parties espousing left economic policies were culturally con-
servative (Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Marks et al., 2006). The legacy of 
communist parties linked economic left policies with traditionalism, authority and 
nationalism, while reformist forces at the beginning of the 1990s embraced both 
cultural and economic liberalism (Kitschelt, 1992; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Hooghe et 
al., 2002; Marks et al., 2006; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009). As a result, in 
the 1990s communist successor parties were positioned in the lower left quadrant of 
the grid, while anti-communist parties were positioned in the upper right quadrant. 
Given that political cleavages tend to freeze, in many countries of post-communist 
Europe this basic dynamic still holds (Hooghe and Vachudova, 2009).
What about Croatia? During its first term in opposition after the 1991 election, 
the former Communist Party of Croatia transformed into a European-style centre-
left democratic party, embracing liberal cultural values, democracy and capitalism 
(Dolenec, 2008). Though it may be said that initially the party positioned itself in 
the upper left quadrant of the grid, with time it moved towards the upper right quad-
rant of the grid, closely mirroring its Western European counterparts. This move-
ment was the result of a specific historical constellation with at least three inter-
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related elements. First of all, the communist ideology was fully discredited both 
domestically and internationally. It disappeared like ‘a nightmare that fades upon 
waking up’ (Beck, 2001), signalling the end of a historical rift between the East 
and the West, inspiring theses about the ‘end of history’ (cf. Fukuyama, 1992) and 
making advocacy of left economic policies politically untenable. In other words, 
regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed at a time when Western countries advocated 
a uniform recipe of development premised on coupling free and fair elections with 
Washington consensus economic reforms (Dolenec, forthcoming). 
Secondly and partly in reaction to the fall of the Eastern Bloc, the Third Way 
doctrine, adopted initially by Social Democratic parties in England and Germa-
ny under Blair and Schroeder10 (Callinicos, 2001), represented a drastic narrowing 
down of political choice regarding economic policies. Former Communist Parties 
not only hurried to abandon the communist ideology and with it notions of solida-
rity and social justice, but they were adopting a conception of Social Democracy in-
fused with faith in the market as a mechanism of social coordination. Since its 2003 
programme onwards, the Social Democratic Party in Croatia explicitly related its 
programme to the doctrine of the Third Way (Dolenec, 2009). Analogously, while in 
the 1990s the CDU was an authoritarian nationalist party, after the death of Franjo 
Tuđman it underwent a transformation into a European-style Christian Democratic 
Party (Fish and Krickovic, 2003). It combined the affirmation of culturally conser-
vative values and Catholicism, with the need for market reforms and the importance 
of encouraging entrepreneurship and business initiative (Dolenec, 2009), bringing 
its programme in line with its Western counterparts.
Thirdly, the process of European integration, which intensified in Croatia in 
the period after 2005, further strengthened the preference for liberal economic po-
sitions of both major parties in Croatia. Once both parties took a pro-European in-
tegration stance, they integrated the EU’s policy prescriptions which were based 
in liberal economic thinking that prioritised the opening up of economic activity 
to market forces through processes of privatization, deregulation and liberalisation 
(Guillen and Palier, 2004). While in their programmatic documents both major par-
ties in Croatia attempted to reconcile liberal economic prescriptions with social 
objectives, imperatives of liberal economic policies repeatedly carried the day. For 
instance, in 2002 the SDP-led government implemented a pension reform in coope-
10 The political project of the Third Way was influenced by prominent sociologists of globalisa-
tion, most notably Anthony Giddens, who sought to ‘revitalize’ social democracy so that it re-
flected a supposedly ‘post-political’, ‘post-scarcity’, hyper-globalised world in which old class 
distinctions and politics of emancipation were being replaced by life-politics. One of the key 
components of this doctrine was a rejection of socialism and the embracing of market mecha-
nisms of social coordination.
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ration with the World Bank, which was argued to be unavoidable to stabilise the 
system, but which impoverished a large segment of the population, with two thirds 
of pensioners receiving less than the average pension, and a part of the old-age 
population not being covered by the system (Puljiz, 2007; Dolenec, 2007). Since 
then, all subsequent governments continued implementing policies in the area of 
health, employment, social policy and education with the financial assistance of in-
ternational bodies such as the World Bank and the IMF, which are based on liberal 
economic policy prescriptions. Similarly, no parliament in Croatia has considered 
re-evaluating the mandate of the Croatian National Bank as targeting inflation and 
maintaining price stability. As Birch argues, many phenomena that are today termed 
neoliberal, including privatization of national industries or liberalization of trade 
and capital movement, are premised on a monetary policy in which the stability of 
money and the dangers of inflation are key concerns (2012). Such a monetary po-
licy provides collective benefits to the financial community by controlling inflation 
and maintaining stability, while other social groups such as workers would have an 
interest in a monetary policy that targets employment (Goodman, 1991). Regard-
less of the party in government, the mandate of the Croatian National Bank has un-
equivocally furthered the interests of the former group. 
To summarise, though the socioeconomic cleavage carries latent potential for 
parties to take up, no major political actor in Croatia has taken up the empty space 
in that upper left quadrant of the grid.11 The reservoir of potential explanations of-
fered so far can be grouped into three clusters. One cluster refers to historic legacies 
from the communist period and the way in which cleavages among elites structured 
the political party space. Given the ‘freezing’ hypothesis, once the basic dynam-
ics of competition among parties were established, they were difficult to undo. As 
a result, parties linked up to voters primarily along the territorial-cultural dimen-
sion, emphasizing political identity differences among voters, such as nationalism 
and religiosity. Another cluster of explanations focuses on the specific historical 
circumstance of nation-building and war that ensued in Croatia in the early 1990s, 
which made the emergence of the socioeconomic cleavage that more difficult. Here 
the argument is that for as long as there was a threat to the territorial integrity of the 
nation, this cleavage superseded all other conflicts in society; war only exacerbated 
these circumstances further. Finally, the third cluster of explanations focused on the 
11 This empty space was recognized by the newly formed Labour Party, which reaped gains by 
opportunistically claiming that place at the last parliamentary elections in 2011. It won 4.19% of 
votes in the 10 districts, winning 6 seats in Parliament (State Electoral Committee website http://
www.izbori.hr/izbori/dip_ws.nsf/0/A8889C1202F9CA0FC125797B0047D2DC/$File/rezulta-
ti2011_sumarni.pdf). The party has however until now failed to develop a coherent programme 
that would merit its inclusion in the upper left quadrant of the grid. 
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way in which major political parties in Croatia absorbed external institutional influ-
ences, both on the level of ideas and regarding the implementation of concrete po-
licy prescriptions. Taken together this proposed explanatory framework abandoned 
the assumption that real social divides automatically get taken up into the arena of 
parliamentary party politics. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the 
Croatian case deviates from a theory that ‘ignores the role of political elites in craft-
ing party systems’ (Kitschelt et al., 1999: 69).
Though the theory of representative democracy assumes that political parties’ 
objectives should over the long term reflect the dominant power relations in society 
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Evans and Whitefield, 1993), the analysis presented in 
this paper suggests that Croatia is witnessing a significant mismatch between ac-
tual social dynamics and their political representation. Actual structural conditions 
are conducive to producing a socioeconomic cleavage in the arena of parliamentary 
politics, but perhaps this cannot happen without pressure from below, whereby an 
effective social movement mobilises citizens by demanding political representation 
based on socioeconomic interests. According to Weininger, interests, no matter how 
objective they may be, cannot trigger collective social action on their own (2005). 
Instead, collective social action and mobilization presuppose effective symbolic 
representation. In Bourdieu’s terms, notwithstanding the fact that a division of the 
social world is well-founded in reality, it is only through articulation by a political 
actor that a theoretical group becomes a practical one (1987). This brings us right 
back to the initial discussion regarding contemporary failures of representative de-
mocracy. Much of this literature presents the dynamic of political representation as 
if citizens are presented with a set of meaningful political options from which they 
choose, as if exercising a passive consumer choice. In contrast to that, the implica-
tions of this analysis are that effective representation of socioeconomic interests in 
the parliamentary arena must be fought for through political articulation and mobi-
lisation of broad social support. 
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